2004N38ϊ
|
‘Collusion,
Fluctuating Demand, and Price Rigidity |
Τ ½isεwoΟ€j |
‘Sophisticated
Voters and Line-item Veto in Separation of Powers
|
{θ _κiεwoΟw€Θj |
‘Absorbing
States in Two-Player Games with Forward-Looking Agents |
΄ εin[o[hεwεw@j |
2004N39ϊ @
|
‘Cooperative
Licensing in the Bertrand Competition with Differentiated Commodities |
nη² Όχisεwj |
‘Why are
Generous Contributors Punished? - Endogenous
Institutions in Public Goods Experiments |
ac uΫόiΝ±ΎΔ’εwj |
‘Efficiency
results in N player games with imperfect private monitoring |
R{ TκiεwoΟwj |
‘A Role of Redistribution
for the Voluntary Provision of Public Good in the Social Contractual
State |
{μ q‘i_ΛεwoΟw€Θj |
‘On the Negative Result in
Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring |
Φϋ iisεwoΟ€j |
‘An Evolutionary
Analysis of Pre-Play Communication and Efficiency in Games |
VJ €κi_ΛεwoΟoc€j |
‘Incomplete Information Games
with Multiple Priors |
Fδ Mui‘l§εwoΟwj |
2004N310ϊ |
‘Overconfidence in Economic
Contests |
ΐ‘ εiτ€εw@εwj |
‘Emergence of Leadership
in Teams |
A pΆi_Λεwocw€Θj |
‘Decentralized Trade, Random
Utility and the Evolution of Social Welfare@
|
_ζ ΉGiεwoΟw€Θj@
|