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International Conference on Gema Theory and International Cooperation: Global Environmental Problems
Date: March 24 - 27, 1998
Place: Kyoto International Community House, Japan


March 24 (Tuesday)@
¡Welcoming speeches@
Takamitsu Sawa (Kyoto University) Shigeo Sahto (JST)@
¡Morning Session@
Chair. Haruo Imai(Kyoto University)@
¡Proportional Cutbacks as an Institution for Promotiong International Cooperation:Success and Limitations@
Roy Gardner(Indiana University)@
¡Social Development Promoted by Cooperation: A Simple Game Model@
Akira Okada(Kyoto University)@
¡Afternoon Session@
Chair: Kunio Kawamata (Keio University)@
¡Global Environment Management: Incentives for Abatement Investment Anticipating an International Bargaining@
Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara (Univesity of Tokyo) and Kazuhiro Kiyono (Waseda University)@
¡Long-term Relationship and Information Accumulation@
Michihiro Kandori (Univesity of Tokyo)@
¡Special Lecture@
Chair: Mitsuo Suzuki (Tokyo Science University)@
¡Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality in Game Interactions@
Reinhard Selten (University of Bonn)@

March 25(Wednesday)@
¡Morning Session@
Chair. Akira Yamazaki(Hitotsubashi University)@
¡Paration Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice@
Kotaro Suzumura(Hitotsubashi University)@
¡Confict Resolution under Asymmetric Information@
Karl Warneryd(Stockholm School of Economics)@

March 26(Thursday)@
¡Morning Session@
Mikio Nakayama(Keio University)@
¡The Diffusion of Social Norms@
Peyton Young(Johns Hopkins University)@
¡Stability and Segragation in Group Formation@
Eyal Winter(Washington University)@
¡Afternoon Session@
Chair: Tatsuyoshi Saijo (Osaka University)@
¡Everyone is A Thief!? Generalized Distrust and Social Intelligence@
Toshio Yamagishi (Hokkaido University)@
¡Recall in Extensive Form Games@
Klaus Ritzberger (Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna)@

March 27(Friday)@
¡Morning Session@
Chair. Shigeo Muto(Tokyu Metropolitan University)@
¡Coalition-Proof Nash Allocation in a Barter Game with Multiple Indivisible Goods@
Jun Wakao(Gakushuin University)@
¡Effecient Algorithm for Locationg the Nucleolus for Assignment Games@
T.E.S Raghavan(University of Illinois at Chicago)@